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OF DONAHUE AND FIDUCIARY DUTY:
MUCH ADO ABOUT . . . ?
DOUGLAS K. MOLL*
INTRODUCTION
In the landmark decision of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts discussed the dangers
faced by minority shareholders in closely held corporations, as well
as the obstacles that such shareholders encounter in challenging op
pressive conduct under traditional corporate law1:
Although the corporate form provides . . . advantages for the
stockholders (limited liability, perpetuity, and so forth), it also
supplies an opportunity for the majority stockholders to oppress
or disadvantage minority stockholders. The minority is vulnera
ble to a variety of oppressive devices, termed “freeze-outs,”
which the majority may employ. An authoritative study of such
“freeze-outs” enumerates some of the possibilities: “The squeez
ers (those who employ the freeze-out techniques) may refuse to
declare dividends; they may drain off the corporation’s earnings
in the form of exorbitant salaries and bonuses to the majority
shareholder-officers and perhaps to their relatives, or in the form
of high rent by the corporation for property leased from majority
shareholders . . . ; they may deprive minority shareholders of cor
porate offices and of employment by the company; they may
cause the corporation to sell its assets at an inadequate price to
the majority shareholders . . . .” In particular, the power of the
board of directors, controlled by the majority, to declare or with
hold dividends and to deny the minority employment is easily
converted to a device to disadvantage minority stockholders.
The minority can, of course, initiate suit against the majority
and their directors. Self-serving conduct by directors is pro
scribed by the director’s fiduciary obligation to the corporation.
However, in practice, the plaintiff will find difficulty in challeng
ing dividend or employment policies. Such policies are consid
ered to be within the judgment of the directors . . . . [G]enerally,
* Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P. Professor of Law, University of Houston
Law Center.
1. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
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plaintiffs who seek judicial assistance against corporate dividend
or employment policies do not prevail.
Thus, when these types of “freeze-outs” are attempted by
the majority stockholders, the minority stockholders, cut off from
all corporation-related revenues, must either suffer their losses or
seek a buyer for their shares . . . . [They] must liquidate [their]
investment in the close corporation in order to reinvest the funds
in income-producing enterprises.
At this point, the true plight of the minority stockholder in a
close corporation becomes manifest. He cannot easily reclaim
his capital. In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissi
dent minority stockholder could sell his stock in order to extri
cate some of his invested capital. By definition, this market is not
available for shares in the close corporation . . . .
Thus, in a close corporation, the minority stockholders may
be trapped in a disadvantageous situation. No outsider would
knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority.
The outsider would have the same difficulties. To cut losses, the
minority stockholder may be compelled to deal with the majority.
This is the capstone of the majority plan. Majority “freeze-out”
schemes which withhold dividends are designed to compel the
minority to relinquish stock at inadequate prices. When the mi
nority stockholder agrees to sell out at less than fair value, the
majority has won.2

To protect against this potential for abuse, the Donahue court
concluded that shareholders in closely held corporations owed a fi
duciary duty of “utmost good faith and loyalty”3 to each other:
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close corpo
ration to the partnership, the trust and confidence which are es
sential to this scale and manner of enterprise, and the inherent
danger to minority interests in the close corporation, we hold
that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another sub
stantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enter
prise that partners owe to one another. In our previous
decisions, we have defined the standard of duty owed by partners
to one another as the “utmost good faith and loyalty.” Stock
holders in close corporations must discharge their management
and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with this strict
2. Id. at 513-15 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting F.H.
O’NEAL & J. DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES:
“SQUEEZE OUTS” 42 (1961)).
3. Id. at 515 (quoting Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952)) (in
ternal quotation marks omitted).
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good faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency
or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other
stockholders and to the corporation.4

Donahue played a significant role in spawning a new era of
judicial activity5 that focused on providing protection to minority
shareholders in closely held corporations from abusive majority
conduct. Donahue’s influence in this “movement” has been farreaching, as a number of courts outside of Massachusetts have also
imposed a fiduciary duty between shareholders in closely held cor
porations.6 Indeed, due in no small part to decisions like Donahue,
most jurisdictions have gradually come to recognize that closely
held corporations and their publicly held counterparts, as well as
the expectations of the shareholders in those ventures, are suffi
ciently distinct to warrant a different legal treatment.7
Unquestionably, Donahue’s legacy stems primarily from its
recognition of the dangers faced by minority shareholders in closely
held corporations. But did Donahue do more than simply call at
tention to the plight of the minority shareholder—did Donahue
change the law? And if so, how? After Donahue, in other words,
4. Id. (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Cardullo, 105 N.E.2d at
845).
5. That judicial activity was often aided by statute. As one authority observes,
“Thirty-nine states have statutes providing for dissolution or other relief on the grounds
of ‘oppressive actions’ (or similar term) by ‘directors or those in control.’” DOUGLAS
K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, THE LAW OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS
§ 7.01[D][1][b], at 7-70 n.192 (2009) (citations omitted); see also id. at 7-163 to 7-181,
fig. 7.1 (providing a fifty state chart on oppression statutes and their operative
language).
6. See, e.g., Georgeson v. DuPage Surgical Consultants, Ltd., No. 05 CV 1653,
2007 WL 914219, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2007); Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F.
Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-59 (W.D.
Pa. 1984); Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 991 (Ind. 1998);
Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d
167, 170-71 (Miss. 1989); Whitehorn v. Whitehorn Farms, Inc., 195 P.3d 836, 843 (Mont.
2008); I.P. Homeowners, Inc. v. Radtke, 558 N.W.2d 582, 589 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997);
Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 456-57 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001); Crosby v.
Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989); A. Teixeira & Co. v. Teixeira, 699 A.2d 1383,
1386-88 (R.I. 1997); McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 150, 156 (Utah 2009); Jorgen
sen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98, 104-06 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); see also Hollis v.
Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[Donahue’s] recognition of special
rules of fiduciary duty applicable to close corporations has gained widespread accept
ance”); Hoggett v. Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 488 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting that “a
majority shareholder’s fiduciary duty ordinarily runs to the corporation,” but stating
that “in certain limited circumstances, a majority shareholder who dominates control
over the business may owe such a duty to the minority shareholder” (citations
omitted)).
7. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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was the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corporations different
from what it was before under traditional corporate law?
The Donahue opinion itself suggests that it is changing the
traditional law of fiduciary duty, as it contrasts the “strict good faith
standard” that it announced with “the somewhat less stringent stan
dard of fiduciary duty to which directors and stockholders of all
corporations must adhere in the discharge of their corporate re
sponsibilities.”8 Unfortunately, other than generally emphasizing
that the Donahue duty is “strict,” “more rigorous,” and “more ex
acting” than fiduciary duty under traditional corporate law,9 the
Donahue opinion gives very little guidance on precisely what is dif
ferent about the duty it articulates. Similarly, it is not clear how
those differences should affect a judicial inquiry beyond the vague
notion that the analysis should be more rigorous. Although the
later Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. decision refined the
Donahue framework by introducing a legitimate business purpose
inquiry, the Wilkes court largely reaffirmed the core fiduciary duty
holding of Donahue without further elaborating on the differences
between the Donahue duty and fiduciary duty generally.10
This Article seeks to articulate precisely how Donahue and its
progeny changed the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corpora
tions. Surprisingly, some of the changes that Donahue is credited
with may not be changes in corporate law at all, while other
changes suggested by Donahue (and acted on by later cases) de
serve more attention.
Part I argues that certain changes in the law that Donahue is
credited with are not really changes at all. Traditional corporate
law, in other words, already provides a shareholder-to-shareholder
fiduciary duty, imposes that duty on the minority in certain circum
stances, and regulates the disproportionate award of de facto divi
dends. Moreover, Donahue’s partnership analogy does not
effectuate a change in the law, as neither Donahue nor traditional
corporate law would allow partnership principles to apply in toto to
closely held corporation disputes.
Part II asserts that the real changes in the law brought about by
Donahue are the protections provided to employment and manage
ment rights even in the absence of de facto dividends, and the dilu
8. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515-16 (footnote omitted).
9. Id.
10. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-63 (Mass.
1976); see also infra notes 11, 71 (discussing Wilkes).
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tion of business judgment rule deference in the closely held setting.
Traditional corporate law does not consider employment and man
agement interests to be part of one’s rights as a shareholder. Fur
ther, the business judgment rule ordinarily makes it especially
difficult to challenge majority conduct that is harmful to those inter
ests. By providing protection to employment and management
rights and significant scrutiny of majority decisions that affect those
rights, Donahue and its progeny did change the law in ways that
benefit minority investors in closely held corporations.11
I. DONAHUE’S CHANGES: MUCH ADO ABOUT . . . NOTHING
A. The Shareholder-to-Shareholder Fiduciary Duty
To whom are fiduciary duties owed? Under traditional corpo
rate law, fiduciary duties are conventionally viewed as running to
11. In applying the fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty, the Donahue
court also announced an accompanying “equal opportunity” rule:
[I]f the stockholder whose shares were purchased was a member of the con
trolling group, the controlling stockholders must cause the corporation to offer
each stockholder an equal opportunity to sell a ratable number of his shares to
the corporation at an identical price. Purchase by the corporation confers sub
stantial benefits on the members of the controlling group whose shares were
purchased. These benefits are not available to the minority stockholders if the
corporation does not also offer them an opportunity to sell their shares. The
controlling group may not, consistent with its strict duty to the minority, utilize
its control of the corporation to obtain special advantages and disproportion
ate benefit from its share ownership.
Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518 (footnote omitted). This Article does not consider the
equal opportunity rule to be a change in the law because, soon after the Donahue opin
ion was rendered, Massachusetts effectively abandoned the rule. In Wilkes, the Massa
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed the Donahue fiduciary duty, but scaled
back the accompanying equal opportunity standard. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. In
its place, the court articulated an oppression framework that effectively permits une
qual treatment between controlling and minority shareholders so long as: (1) a legiti
mate business purpose exists for such unequal treatment; and (2) there is no alternative
course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest. See id.; see also Frank H. Eas
terbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV.
271, 296 (1986) (“The court in Wilkes inquired into the business purpose of the conduct
at issue . . . . Thus the court effectively repudiated the equal opportunity rule of Donahue.”). Moreover, a number of courts outside of Massachusetts have rejected the equal
opportunity aspect of Donahue. See, e.g., Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d
642, 647-54 (Md. 1985); Delahoussaye v. Newhard, 785 S.W.2d 609, 611-12 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990); see also Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993) (“It is well
established in our jurisprudence that stockholders need not always be treated equally
for all purposes.”). The language of some opinions, however, still seems to embrace the
equal opportunity rule. See, e.g., Crosby, 548 N.E.2d at 221 (“Majority or controlling
shareholders breach such fiduciary duty to minority shareholders when control of the
close corporation is utilized to prevent the minority from having an equal opportunity
in the corporation.” (citations omitted)).
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the corporation (or to the shareholders collectively), but not to an
individual shareholder.12 As a consequence, a minority shareholder
can have difficulty challenging, for example, a termination of em
ployment or a removal from management on traditional fiduciary
duty grounds, as a court usually requires that harm to the corpora
tion be shown, rather than harm merely to the minority share
holder.13 By holding that shareholders in a closely held corporation
“owe one another” a fiduciary duty, however, courts such as Donahue change the principal focus of a fiduciary duty analysis to an
individual shareholder.14 A plaintiff shareholder can emphasize the
harm that he (rather than the corporation) has suffered, and the
12. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir.
1984) (observing that “directors’ duties of loyalty and care run to the corporation, not
to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders”); Hoggett v.
Brown, 971 S.W.2d 472, 488 (Tex. App. 1997) (“A director’s fiduciary duty runs only to
the corporation, not to individual shareholders or even to a majority of the sharehold
ers.”); id. at 488 n.13 (“We note that a majority shareholder’s fiduciary duty ordinarily
runs to the corporation.”); Faour v. Faour, 789 S.W.2d 620, 621-22 (Tex. App. 1990) (“A
corporate officer owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders collectively, i.e. the corpora
tion, but he does not occupy a fiduciary relationship with an individual shareholder,
unless some contract or special relationship exists between them in addition to the cor
porate relationship.”); McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 153 (Utah 2009) (“Under
the revised business code, directors and officers are required to carry out their corpo
rate duties in good faith, with prudent care, and in the best interest of the corporation.
These corporate duties have been interpreted to coincide with the common law under
standing that officers and directors owe these duties to the corporation and sharehold
ers collectively, not individually.” (citation omitted)); Lynch v. Patterson, 701 P.2d 1126,
1136 (Wyo. 1985) (“The duty of the directors . . . is a duty to the corporation and not a
duty to the stockholder instituting the action.”); J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P.
Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining
Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 & n.30 (1977) (mentioning the tradi
tional view that duties run “solely between the majority and the corporation,” and ob
serving that “[t]he notion that the fiduciary obligations of management run only to the
corporation provides the minority in close corporations virtually no protection against
oppression and exploitation by the control group”).
13. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 12, at 12 (“[C]ourts undoubtedly . . .
have been influenced by traditional common law attitudes emphasizing . . . proof of
harm to the corporation, as distinguished from the interests of individual sharehold
ers.”); cf. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 513 & n.14 (noting, while discussing traditional fidu
ciary duty principles, that “in practice, the plaintiff will find difficulty in challenging
dividend or employment policies,” and observing that “[i]t would be difficult for the
plaintiff in the instant case to establish breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the corpora
tion, as indicated by the finding of the trial judge” (emphasis added)).
14. See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. Indeed, the court found that the share
holder-to-shareholder fiduciary duty was breached, even though the court did not disa
gree with the trial court’s finding that the stock repurchase was fair to the corporation.
See id. at 519 (“Although the purchase price for the controlling stockholder’s shares
may seem fair to the corporation and other stockholders . . . the controlling stockholder
whose stock has been purchased has still received a relative advantage over his fellow
stockholders, inconsistent with his strict fiduciary duty.” (citation omitted)).
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action can be brought directly without having to comply with deriv
ative lawsuit requirements.15
While Donahue has been credited with contributing to this le
gal development, the notion of a shareholder-to-shareholder fiduci
ary duty is not unique to Donahue and its progeny. Under
traditional corporate law, a number of judicial decisions speak of a
duty owed by the majority to the minority in the controlling share
holder context.16 Even Delaware—a jurisdiction that has explicitly
rejected special common law rules for minority shareholders in
closely held corporations17—has judicial decisions indicating that
controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties directly to individual
15. See, e.g., Joseph v. Koshy, No. 01-98-01432-CV, 2000 WL 124685, at *4 (Tex.
App. Feb. 3, 2000) (stating that plaintiff minority shareholders’ allegations of oppres
sion and breach of fiduciary duty “were individual [actions] and did not belong to the
corporation,” and concluding, as a result, that compliance with derivative lawsuit re
quirements was unnecessary); id. (noting that plaintiff minority shareholders alleged
“breach of a fiduciary duty owed to them,” and stating that “[c]ourts have recognized
minority shareholders’ individual causes of action for oppressive conduct and breach of
fiduciary duty” (emphasis added)).
16. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919) (noting that “[t]he
majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary relation
toward the minority . . . .”); In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 512-13, 520 (3d Cir. 1983)
(concluding, in a lawsuit by a minority shareholder (Reading Company) for breach of
fiduciary duty, that “neither the directors nor the majority shareholders of [the corpora
tion] have breached their fiduciary duty to Reading”); Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683
A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1996) (“To be sure, the Majority Stockholders may well owe fiduciary
duties to Nagy [a single shareholder] as a minority stockholder.”); Yiannatsis v.
Stephanis, 653 A.2d 275, 279 & n.3, 280 (Del. 1995) (noting that Demos and Stella were
controlling shareholders of the corporation and that John was a minority shareholder,
and stating that “Demos and Stella had a fiduciary duty to [John] as an individual as
well as their fiduciary duty to the corporation”); see also Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 F.
Supp. 2d 610, 623-25 (E.D. Va. 1999) (noting that the rule that a director’s fiduciary
duty runs to the shareholders as a class rather than to an individual shareholder is ap
propriate for the publicly held corporation, but acknowledging that “closely-held corpo
rations raise a different set of concerns [:] . . . it is reasonable to conclude that, if faced
with the question whether a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation has a
cognizable claim against an inside director for breach of fiduciary duty in respect of a
corporate transaction which benefits the inside director, the Supreme Court of Virginia
would hold in the affirmative, particularly where, as here, there is only one minority
shareholder”).
17. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993); see also
Clemmer v. Cullinane, 815 N.E.2d 651, 652 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (“That [Nixon] deci
sion—in ‘very forceful dicta’—declined to adopt the heightened fiduciary duty of ‘ut
most good faith and loyalty’ our courts have found applicable to close corporations.
Rather, the court declared that no ‘special judicially-created rules’ would be recognized
to protect minority shareholders in closely held corporations.” (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380-81)). See generally MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 5,
§ 7.01[D][2], at 7-108 to 7-119 (discussing Nixon).
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minority shareholders.18 At least with respect to minority share
holders challenging the actions of a controlling shareholder or con
trolling group, therefore, decisions like Donahue seem unnecessary
to establish a direct, shareholder-centered cause of action.
B. A Duty for Everyone, Including the Minority
Perhaps the change in the law brought about by Donahue and
similar cases is the fact that minority shareholders may also owe a
fiduciary duty. Traditional corporate law accepts that controlling
shareholders owe fiduciary duties, but whether minority sharehold
ers owe similar duties is less clear. In Donahue, however, the court
explicitly stated that “[w]e do not limit our holding to majority
stockholders,” and it noted that, “[i]n the close corporation, the mi
nority may do equal damage through unscrupulous and improper
‘sharp dealings’ with an unsuspecting majority.”19
While the notion that Donahue changed the law by imposing a
fiduciary duty on minority shareholders is promising, there are two
complications. First, presumably a minority shareholder would not
be subject to a fiduciary duty analysis unless the minority possessed
the power to cause harm to the corporation or the other sharehold
ers. The possession of such power, however, would likely cause a
court to characterize the minority as a de facto controlling share
holder—at least with respect to the activities that the minority does
have the power to control.20 Even without the Donahue holding, in
other words, traditional corporate law might be sufficiently pliable
to allow a court to impose a fiduciary duty on a minority share

18. See supra note 16.
19. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17; see, e.g., A.W. Chesterton Co. v. Chesterton, 128 F.3d 1, 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (concluding that a minority shareholder breached his
fiduciary duty by threatening to transfer his shares in a manner that would have de
stroyed the S-corporation status of the company); see also Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524
N.E.2d 849, 853 (Mass. 1988) (noting that “[t]he protections of Donahue are not limited
to those with less than 50% share ownership,” and stating that “fiduciary obligations
may arise regardless of percentage of share ownership”); Whitehorn v. Whitehorn
Farms, Inc., 195 P.3d 836, 843 (Mont. 2008) (noting that “fiduciary duties run between
all shareholders, not just from majority shareholders to minority shareholders”).
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Atl. Props., 422 N.E.2d 798, 799, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
(involving a 25% minority shareholder who possessed a veto power pursuant to an 80%
supermajority provision: “The 80% provision may have substantially the effect of re
versing the usual roles of the majority and the minority shareholders. The minority,
under that provision, becomes an ad hoc controlling interest”).
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holder under the “controlling” shareholder precedents. The mat
ter, however, is not free from doubt.21
Second, it is not clear that other jurisdictions have followed
this part of the Donahue holding.22 Many of the non-Massachusetts
courts imposing a fiduciary duty between shareholders in closely
held corporations speak of a duty owed by the majority or control
ling shareholder to the minority shareholders.23 While such state
21. See, e.g., Merner v. Merner, 129 Fed. App’x 342, 342-44 (9th Cir. 2005) (al
lowing a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to transfer shares in a man
ner that destroyed the S-corporation status of the company, and concluding that a
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation owes no special fiduciary duties); cf.
Hunt v. Data Mgmt. Res., Inc., 985 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing a
minority shareholder in a closely held corporation to transfer shares in a manner that
destroyed the S-corporation status of the company, and noting that “[t]he law does not
impose a strict fiduciary duty on a shareholder to act in the best interests of the corpo
ration; a shareholder is free to act in his or her own self-interest”).
22. It is not clear, in other words, that the law, at least outside of Massachusetts,
has changed on this point.
23. See, e.g., Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(stating that “the majority shareholder of a closely-held corporation clearly has a fiduci
ary responsibility to the other shareholders” (citation omitted)); Orchard v. Covelli, 590
F. Supp. 1548, 1556 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (discussing “the majority’s fulfillment of its fiduci
ary duty to the other shareholders”); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 171 (Miss. 1989)
(concluding that “in a close corporation where a majority stockholder stands to benefit
as a controlling stockholder, the majority’s action must be ‘intrinsically fair’ to the mi
nority interest”); Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989) (“Generally, major
ity shareholders have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders.”); Hoggett v. Brown,
971 S.W.2d 472, 488 n.13 (Tex. App. 1997) (noting that “a majority shareholder’s fiduci
ary duty ordinarily runs to the corporation,” but stating that “in certain limited circum
stances, a majority shareholder who dominates control over the business may owe such
a duty to the minority shareholder”); Jorgensen v. Water Works, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 98,
105 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (“Courts in other jurisdictions that, like Wisconsin, recognize a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty by directors and majority shareholders to minority
shareholders have permitted such claims in circumstances factually similar to those al
leged here.”).
Like Donahue, other cases speak of a fiduciary duty owed between shareholders in
closely held corporations. Unlike Donahue, however, these cases do not include lan
guage explicitly imposing this duty upon minority shareholders. Moreover, the fact pat
terns do not involve minority shareholder defendants. See, e.g., Georgeson v. DuPage
Surgical Consultants, Ltd., No. 05 CV 1653, 2007 WL 914219, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22,
2007) (stating that “[s]hareholders in a close corporation owe a fiduciary duty to deal
fairly, honestly, and openly with each other,” but involving alleged misconduct by the
controlling shareholders); Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985,
987 & n.3, 991 (Ind. 1998) (stating that “we have held that ‘shareholders in a close
corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to each other, and as such, must deal fairly,
honestly, and openly with the corporation and with their fellow shareholders,’” but
involving alleged misconduct by a 50% shareholder (quoting Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d
559, 561 (Ind. 1995))); Evans v. Blesi, 345 N.W.2d 775, 777-80 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that “Blesi and Evans were partners in a closely held corporation,” that “the
relationship between them was fiduciary,” and that “[t]he law imposes on each the high
est standard of integrity in their dealings with each other,” but involving alleged mis

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE208.txt

480

unknown

Seq: 10

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

10:14

[Vol. 33:471

ments do not preclude a finding that a minority shareholder also
owes a fiduciary duty, the explicitness of the proposition in Donahue is not usually present in these other opinions.24
C. The Policing of De Facto Dividends
It could be argued that Donahue changed the law by signaling
a willingness to provide greater judicial assistance to shareholders
challenging dividend or employment policies. After mentioning
that “[s]uch policies are considered to be within the judgment of the
directors,” and after observing that, “generally, plaintiffs who seek
judicial assistance against corporate dividend or employment poli
cies do not prevail,” the court then imposed its duty of utmost good
faith and loyalty.25 The juxtaposition of problem and apparent so
lution suggests that the court meant for the Donahue duty to pro
vide greater judicial scrutiny of majority dividend and employment
decisions than traditional corporate law would provide.
While there is something to the notion that Donahue altered
the traditional business judgment rule discretion afforded to manconduct by a 50% shareholder who later became a controlling shareholder);
McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 151, 156, 158 (Utah 2009) (concluding that
“shareholders in closely held corporations owe their coshareholders fiduciary obliga
tions,” but involving alleged misconduct by a controlling shareholder).
Other cases indicate that a fiduciary duty is imposed upon minority shareholders
by (1) explicit language saying as much and/or (2) fact patterns involving minority
shareholder defendants. See, e.g., Whitehorn, 195 P.3d at 843 (noting that “fiduciary
duties run between all shareholders, not just from majority shareholders to minority
shareholders,” but involving a claim against majority shareholders); I.P. Homeowners,
Inc. v. Radtke, 558 N.W.2d 582, 589, 591-92 (Neb. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that
“[s]hareholders in a close corporation owe one another the same fiduciary duty as that
owed by one partner to another in a partnership,” and imposing a fiduciary duty on a
minority shareholder who usurped a corporate opportunity); A. Teixeira & Co. v. Tei
xeira, 699 A.2d 1383, 1386-87 (R.I. 1997) (stating that “[t]oday we conclude on the basis
of the small number of shareholders in plaintiff corporation, the active participation by
these shareholders in management decisions, and their close and intimate working rela
tions, that the shareholders of plaintiff corporation, by acting as if they were partners,
thus assumed a fiduciary duty toward one another and their corporation,” and imposing
that duty on two minority shareholders who allegedly usurped a corporate opportu
nity); cf. Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 456, 458 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting that “some courts have explicitly recognized that the [fiduciary] duty extends to
minority shareholders in close corporations,” but stating that “[i]n adopting the Massa
chusetts approach, we are clearly aligning ourselves with the line of cases which impose
a high duty of candor and good faith when majority shareholders are dealing with mi
nority shareholders”).
24. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
25. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-15 (Mass. 1975) (foot
note omitted).
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agers over internal business matters,26 the claim should not be over
stated. Dividend and employment policies are frequently used to
deny a minority investor his proportionate share of the distributed
profits of the company. When used in this manner, however, tradi
tional corporate law is available to remedy the misconduct.
For example, it is common for a closely held corporation to
distribute its earnings to shareholders in the form of employmentrelated compensation rather than in the form of dividends.27 Many
closely held corporations, in other words, distribute profit to share
holders not as “true” dividends but as “de facto” dividends—i.e.,
dividends disguised, for tax purposes, as employment-related com
pensation.28 So long as all of the stockholders are receiving their
proportionate share of any de facto dividends, the presence of such
dividends is largely unobjectionable.29 When a controlling share
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. When calculating its taxable income, a closely held corporation can deduct
reasonable salaries paid to its employees to decrease the amount of income tax that the
company pays. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006) (stating that “a reasonable allowance
for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered” is deducti
ble). A closely held corporation cannot, however, deduct any dividends paid to its
shareholders. Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasona
ble Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 197 n.12 (1988). As a consequence, corporate
income paid as dividends is subject to double taxation—once as business income at the
corporate level, and once as personal income at the shareholder level. Id. As a result
of the tax-disadvantaged nature of dividends, many closely held corporations forego
“true” dividends and instead provide a return to shareholders via salary and other em
ployment-related benefits. See, e.g., Landorf v. Glottstein, 500 N.Y.S.2d 494, 499 (Sup.
Ct. 1986) (stating that, in a closely held corporation, “dividends are often provided by
means of salaries to shareholders”); Hirschkorn v. Severson, 319 N.W.2d 475, 477 (N.D.
1982) (“[T]he corporation paid no dividends . . . . Rather, the corporate directors dis
tributed the profits via salary increases, bonuses, and benefits.”). It should be noted
that the impact of the double tax is ameliorated by the fact that qualifying dividends (as
well as long-term capital gains) are presently taxed at a 15% rate, which is lower than
the highest rates applicable to salary and other forms of ordinary income. See IRS.GOV,
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p17/ch08.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). Unless ex
tended, the current 15% rate is set to expire at the end of 2010. Tax Cuts Set to Expire
at the End of 2010: What This May Mean for Investors (Sept. 28, 2010), available at
https://admin.emeraldconnect.com/files/44735/Janney%20Tax%20Sunsetting.pdf.
28. See supra note 27.
29. While perhaps unobjectionable to the shareholders, such de facto dividends
are objectionable to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The IRS often sues to disal
low the deduction of “unreasonable” amounts of compensation. When the IRS is suc
cessful, the amount of compensation that exceeds a “reasonable” amount is treated as a
dividend and is not deductible from the corporation’s income. See, e.g., Eberl’s Claim
Serv., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 249 F.3d 994, 996, 1004 (10th Cir. 2001)
(affirming a determination that a portion of a taxpayer’s salary constituted “disguised
dividend payments that should have been subject to taxation”); Rapco, Inc. v. Comm’r
of Internal Revenue, 85 F.3d 950, 955-56 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a determination that
an officer’s salary was excessive).
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holder terminates the minority’s employment in a corporation
where profits are distributed solely via salary, however, the termi
nation often results in the controlling shareholder continuing to re
ceive de facto dividends while the minority is denied his
proportionate share.30 This is problematic, as a de facto dividend is
still a dividend and, like all dividends, it must ordinarily be paid on
an equivalent, per-share basis.31 Such a non-uniform declaration of
dividends is impermissible and even traditional corporate law—
with its business judgment rule deference—would not protect it.32
30. See, e.g., Landorf, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (“In a close corporation, since divi
dends are often provided by means of salaries to shareholders, loss of salary may be the
functional equivalent of the denial of participation in dividends.”); see also Nagy v.
Riblet Prods. Corp., 79 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Many closely held firms en
deavor to show no profits (to minimize their taxes) and to distribute the real economic
returns of the business to the investors as salary. When firms are organized in this way,
firing an employee is little different from canceling his shares.” (emphasis added)).
31. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980)
(“Courts have not allowed the form of the transaction to prevent tax liability when the
transaction is in substance a distribution of dividends. We think a similar analysis
should apply to payments which exclude some shareholders in a closely held corpora
tion. Such transactions should be examined to determine whether they are in fact a
distribution of dividends, and if so the excluded shareholder must participate equally in
the payments received by other shareholders.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted));
Leslie v. Boston Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 532605, at *9
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2002) (“What must not be done is to make payments only to
the majority shareholders, payments having different names or styles but being in real
ity dividends.”).
32. See, e.g., Cratty v. Peoria Law Library Ass’n, 76 N.E. 707, 708 (Ill. 1906)
(“Dividends among stockholders of the same class must always be equal and without
discrimination . . . .”); Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 645 (Md. 1985)
(“We have said that a corporation in making a dividend . . . has no power to discrimi
nate between its stockholders [of the same class].” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509,
519 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that “ordinarily . . . dividends must be apportioned among
the shareholders pro rata to their several holdings”); In re Sealand Corp. S’holders
Litig., 642 A.2d 792, 799 (Del. Ch. 1993) (noting the “uncontroversial proposition” that
“all shares of the same type, series, or class are, by definition, equal”). As the Sealand
court observed:
It has long been acknowledged that absent an express agreement or statute to
the contrary, all shares of stock are equal. Flowing from that premise is the
rule that all shares of the same class or series are equally entitled to share in
the profits of the corporation and in the distribution of its assets on
liquidation.
Id. at 799 n.10 (citations omitted).
As the above citations suggest, the business judgment rule would not prevent a
court from granting relief if only certain shareholders received dividends. Such conduct
would likely be viewed as fraud, bad faith, or irrational conduct—all of which would
preclude application of the rule. See, e.g., Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the
Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 471 &
n.18 (1985) (“If only certain shareholders received dividends, the business judgment
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Simply put, disputes involving de facto dividends are relatively
easy to resolve. After all, these disputes typically involve a control
ling shareholder who takes a disproportionate amount of the com
pany’s profit. Such conduct is clearly unlawful, and it can be
characterized as unlawful in a number of different ways—e.g., fraud
on the minority investors, bad faith to the minority investors, an
illegal dividend to the majority, or plain and simple theft by the
majority.33 Thus, the existence of a Donahue duty is not needed to
trigger liability in de facto dividend disputes, even when those dis
putes involve employment issues. If dividends are distributed in a
disproportionate manner through employment, related-party con
tracts, or any other manner, such conduct is antithetical to the pro
rata nature of a dividend and is illegal under traditional corporate
law principles.34
To be clear, one can credit Donahue with recognizing that em
ployment in a closely held corporation is often a vehicle for distrib
uting de facto dividends.35 This recognition is an important
contribution. My point is simply that traditional corporate law al
ready prohibits disproportionate dividends, and the de facto nature
of the dividends should make no difference. Thus, while Donahue’s
recognition of the employment-as-disguised-dividends problem is
important, the Donahue duty is not needed to regulate the
problem.
D. The Application of Partnership Principles
As part of its rationale for imposing a shareholder-to-share
holder fiduciary duty, the Donahue court discussed the similarities
between the closely held corporation and the partnership.36 Ac
cording to the court, “[m]any close corporations are ‘really partnerrule would not bar a court from granting relief to the excluded shareholders. . . . Such
conduct would presumably lack the ‘rational basis’ required for the invocation of the
business judgment rule. It would also strongly indicate [a] lack of good faith.”); see also
infra note 68 and accompanying text. As mentioned, because employment is often the
vehicle for distributing profits in a closely held corporation, the termination of a minor
ity shareholder’s employment can be a mechanism for the majority to appropriate a
disproportionate share of the company’s income stream to itself. In such circumstances,
the termination would likely be viewed as tainted by a conflict of interest, which would
also preclude the application of the business judgment rule. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
35. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14 (Mass. 1975).
36. See id. at 512-15.
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ships, between two or three people who contribute their capital,
skills, experience and labor.’”37 Similarly, the court observed that
“[c]ommentators and courts have noted that the close corporation
is often little more than an ‘incorporated’ or ‘chartered’ partner
ship.”38 Perhaps the legal change effectuated by Donahue, there
fore, is that it provides doctrinal authority for courts to incorporate
partnership principles into closely held corporation disputes.39
Such an interpretation of Donahue, however, is erroneous.
The Donahue court was not arguing for the wholesale application
of partnership principles to the closely held corporation. The court
analogized to partnerships simply to impose a partnership-like
owner-to-owner fiduciary duty.40 Other aspects of partnership law
that might have been helpful to the plaintiff—e.g., the more liberal
dissolution rules, or the granting of a right to participate in the
management of the business41—were not imported. This strongly
suggests that the Donahue court did not intend to hold that part
nership law applies in toto to closely held corporation disputes. As
further evidence, in the later decision of Wilkes v. Springside Nurs
ing Home, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court con
fronted the issue of whether a minority shareholder could be
removed from the management of a closely held corporation.42 The
court granted relief to the plaintiff minority without even referenc
ing a partner’s right to participate in the management of the busi
ness.43 Finally, in the recent decision of Brodie v. Jordan, the
Supreme Judicial Court addressed the propriety of a buyout award
in a closely held corporation dispute.44 The court’s analysis does
not even mention the right under partnership law to a buyout or
dissolution upon the dissociation of a partner from the business.45
37. Id. at 512 (quoting Kruger v. Gerth, 210 N.E.2d 355, 356 (N.Y. 1965)
(Desmond, C.J., dissenting)).
38. Id.
39. I have had several conversations with practicing attorneys who read Donahue
and similar precedents as authority for precisely this point.
40. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 (1997) (imposing fiduciary duties on a
partner that he owes to the partnership “and the other partners”). As discussed, it is
not clear that an analogy to partnership law was necessary to impose this duty. Under
traditional corporate law, a number of judicial decisions speak of a duty owed by the
majority to the minority in the controlling shareholder context. See supra Part I.A.
41. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401(f), 801.
42. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
43. Id. at 661-65.
44. Brodie v. Jordan, 857 N.E.2d 1076 (Mass. 2006).
45. Id. at 1080-82.
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Thus, it is simply inaccurate to read Donahue for the proposition
that partnership law applies in its entirety to closely held corpora
tion disputes.46
Importing the entirety of partnership law into the closely held
corporation setting is unwise from a policy standpoint as well.
While courts such as Donahue suggest that shareholders form a cor
poration for its limited liability protection but otherwise wish to be
treated as partners, that suggestion is questionable. Perhaps the
shareholders chose a corporation to avoid the default agency provi
sions of the partnership structure.47 Perhaps they chose a corpora
tion to eliminate the ability of one owner to veto extraordinary
business decisions.48 Simply put, shareholders in closely held cor
porations may have chosen a corporation for various reasons; as a
result, a wholesale application of partnership law may be just as
likely to defeat their expectations as it is to meet them.49

46. In the previous three sections, the focus of my argument is that Donahue did
not change the law because the same result would be reached under traditional corpo
rate law principles. See supra Part I.A-C. In this section, the focus of my argument is
different—Donahue did not change the law because the purported change is premised
on an erroneous interpretation of the decision.
47. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301 (1997).
48. See id. § 401(j).
49. As Professors Easterbrook and Fischel have observed:
The participants incorporated for a reason. Perhaps the reason was only lim
ited liability or favorable tax treatment, and in all other respects they wanted
to be treated like partners. But this is not the only possibility. Corporate law
is different from partnership law in many ways, and the venturers may desire
to preserve these differences. Partners, for example, are entitled to share
equally in the profits and management of the partnership, are mutual agents
for each other, have the right to veto any decisions made by the majority on
matters outside the ordinary course of business, and have the right to dissolve
the partnership at any time if they are willing to bear the consequences. Cor
porate law treats each of these differently. Proponents of the partnership
analogy assume that participants in closely held corporations are knowledgea
ble enough to incorporate to obtain the benefits of favorable tax treatment or
limited liability but ignorant of all other differences between corporate and
partnership law. There is no support for this assumption once you realize that
people have to jump through a lot of formal hoops (assisted by counsel) to
incorporate but could become partners by accident.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 298 (footnotes omitted); cf. Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Corporations are not partner
ships. Whether to incorporate entails a choice of many formalities. Commercial rules
should be predictable; this objective is best served by treating corporations as what they
are, allowing the investors and other participants to vary the rules by contract if they
think deviations are warranted.”).
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II.

DONAHUE’S CHANGES: MUCH ADO ABOUT . . . SOMETHING
(AND IMPORTANT SOMETHING(S) AT THAT)

A.

The Protection of Employment and Management Rights

Even if a fiduciary duty analysis under traditional corporate
law focuses on an individual shareholder,50 that analysis is impli
cated only when majority conduct affects shareholder rights.51 Em
ployment and management positions with a corporation, however,
are not traditionally viewed as part of one’s rights as a shareholder.
In fact, stock ownership and employment/management benefits are
largely viewed as unrelated in the publicly held setting.52 This helps
to explain why terminations of employment and removals from
management positions—two primary components of a classic
freeze-out—rarely invoke corporate law scrutiny in publicly held
corporations. Such actions are not viewed as affecting shareholder
rights.53
In a closely held corporation, however, most terminations of
employment and removals from management positions do affect
shareholder rights, as employment and management benefits are
typically a substantial part of a shareholder’s return on investment.
50. See supra Part I.A.
51. See, e.g., Riblet Prods. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1996) (“This is not
a case of breach of fiduciary duty to Nagy [a minority shareholder] qua stockholder . . . .
Nagy does not allege that his termination amounted to a wrongful freeze out of his
stock interest in [the corporation], nor does he contend that he was harmed as a stock
holder by being terminated.”).
52. As one commentator observed:
From the standpoint of an employee in a publicly held corporation . . . the
economic interest in stock ownership and the economic interest in employ
ment are largely separate. As a stockholder, the employee’s interest is the
same as all other stockholders. The employee-stockholder seeks an expected
return on his investment that adequately compensates for the risk of investing
in the enterprise. . . .
Such an employee’s interest in his job, by contrast, is some function of the
personal satisfaction that the job brings and the level of monetary compensa
tion and other benefits that the job provides. If the employee is satisfied with
his job, but comes to believe that the stock in his employer is a bad invest
ment, the employee can simply sell the stock. If the employee desires to
change jobs or is fired, but continues to believe that the stock is a good invest
ment, the employee may continue to hold stock in his former employer. The
act of changing jobs does nothing to alter the risk-return calculation that
makes the stock in the employer either a good or a bad investment.
Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations,
77 WASH. U. L. Q. 1099, 1107-08 (1999).
53. Cf. id. at 1108 (“Because these employee and stockholder interests are largely
separate in a publicly held corporation, it is entirely proper that the general corporate
rule provides the employee-stockholder with no special protection against discharge.”).
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As mentioned, many closely held corporations distribute much, if
not all, of their earnings as salaries and other employment compen
sation.54 Consequently, one needs to maintain a job to receive a
financial return on investment. If this were the only purpose of em
ployment and management positions in a closely held corporation,
the Donahue duty would not be needed, as traditional corporate
law can police de facto dividend abuses. In other words, if termina
tions of employment and removals from management positions
have the effect of excluding a minority investor from his share of
the company’s distributed earnings, those actions would be illegal
under traditional corporate law principles.55
Employment and management positions in a closely held cor
poration, however, are important even in the absence of de facto
dividends. Many closely held corporations are small start-up busi
nesses that face a high risk of failure.56 Because of the uncertainty
surrounding whether the business will have any earnings at all, let
alone earnings growth or consistency,57 the shareholder’s initial de
cision to invest is often based primarily on the definitive benefits of
employment and related management positions, rather than on the
speculative possibilities of earnings growth. Indeed, a job and a
management position in a closely held corporation is often associ
ated with a higher salary,58 a significant participatory role in the
54.
55.
56.

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.C.
See MICHAEL E. GERBER, THE E-MYTH REVISITED: WHY MOST SMALL BUSI
NESSES DON’T WORK AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 2 (HarperCollins eds., 1995). As
Gerber observes:
Businesses start and fail in the United States at an increasingly staggering rate.
Every year, over a million people in this country start a business of some sort.
Statistics tell us that by the end of the first year at least 40 percent of them will
be out of business. Within five years, more than 80 percent of them . . . will
have failed . . . . [M]ore than 80 percent of the small businesses that survive
the first five years fail in the second five.
Id.; see also Ragazzo, supra note 52, at 1109 (“Small businesses are exceedingly risky
enterprises with high failure rates.”).
57. Cf. GERBER, supra note 56, at 2 (noting that “hundreds of thousands of people every year . . . pour their energy and capital—and life—into starting a small busi
ness and fail,” and stating that “many others . . . struggle along for years simply trying to
survive”).
58. This assertion, of course, assumes a comparison between similar jobs in busi
nesses at similar stages of development. See, e.g., SHANNON P. PRATT ET AL., VALUING
A BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 121 (3d
ed. 1996) (“It is not uncommon to find an owner/manager of a successful closely held
company earning a greater amount in annual compensation than the amount an
equivalent nonowner employee would earn as compensation.”); see also Bonavita v.
Corbo, 692 A.2d 119, 124 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (“[W]hile there is no claim
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company’s activities,59 and intangible benefits stemming from work
ing for oneself.60 These financial and other benefits of employment
and management positions in a closely held corporation help to off
set the high risk of failure associated with investing in a small busi
ness. Without these benefits, an investment in a closely held
corporation often makes little economic sense:
that the [closely held corporation] salaries are excessive, neither was there a showing
that if the ‘inside’ employment were terminated those family members could earn as
much elsewhere.”); Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tenn. 1997) (noting that the
annual compensation of a shareholder-employee of a commercial printing business
“was in excess of $250,000”).
59. This participatory role provides the shareholder with both the prestige of a
senior management position and the opportunity to monitor his investment:
[I]nvestors are also motivated to commit capital to a close corporation because
of their desire for management participation as a director or officer of the
company. Aside from the prestige and other intangibles associated with hold
ing a director or officer position, a management role also presents an opportu
nity to effectively monitor the shareholder’s investment.
Within a close corporation, such a monitoring ability is vitally important.
After all, close corporation shareholders often invest a substantial portion of
their life savings in the company and, as a consequence, they need some way
of protecting their investment. Unfortunately, a mere shareholder has no say
in routine corporate decisionmaking. Moreover, although shareholders have
the statutory right to inspect a company’s books and records with a proper
purpose, that right is easily hindered by a majority shareholder intent on ob
structing such an inspection. As a consequence, mere shareholders often lack
both a voice in the company’s decisionmaking process as well as access to
information about the company’s affairs. Because management has the ability
to make corporate decisions and has access to corporate information, how
ever, a management role provides a direct opportunity for a shareholder to
effectively participate in and monitor the company’s activities. Ideally, such
an opportunity allows the shareholder to try and steer the business away from
investment-threatening decisions.
Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact Contracts: Is the Share
holder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 989, 1015-16 (2001) (footnotes
omitted); see also 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND
THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 3:6, at
3-45 (2d ed. 2004) (“[L]osing the prestige of a directorship may be of considerable con
sequence to the shareholder.”); id. § 3:7, at 3-57 (referring to the “prestige, privileges,
and patronage that come from controlling a corporation and occupying its principal
offices”).
60. See, e.g., Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1319 (N.Y.
1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) (noting “the challenge, the independence, the prestige,
the feeling of achievement, and the other intangible benefits of being part of the man
agement of a successfully run small company”); see also Steven C. Bahls, Resolving
Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L.
285, 290-91 (1990) (noting that ownership in a closely held corporation includes “the
social status and challenge of operating one’s own company and the satisfaction of pro
viding employment to one’s children”); id. at 319 n.212 (mentioning the “loss of satis
faction and other qualitative perks associated with operating a business”).
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In a closely held corporation, a shareholder-employee has inter
ests in his job and stock that are often economically intertwined.
Holding stock in a closely held corporation, viewed purely as an
investment decision, seems almost irrational from an economic
perspective. Small businesses are exceedingly risky enterprises
with high failure rates. To compensate fairly for this level of risk,
the expected return would also have to be disproportionately
large. Moreover, many investors in small businesses invest a sig
nificant portion of their life savings in the business. This practice
defeats their ability to diversify their investment portfolios and
exposes them to company- and industry-specific risk. As a result,
investors in closely held corporations would seem well advised to
trust their capital to diversified mutual funds rather than a small
corporation.
If investors in closely held corporations are economically ra
tional, it can only be because such investments have compensat
ing benefits not available to investors in publicly held
corporations. In many cases, a shareholder in a closely held cor
poration expects to receive such compensating benefits through
employment. The shareholder may invest for the purpose of hav
ing a job that produces higher compensation than could be gar
nered through employment by third parties. Even if the
employee-shareholder’s compensation is no higher than his next
best alternative, an investment in a closely held corporation may
still be justified because the ability to keep his job may be more
stable and certain. Additionally, the employee may simply derive
satisfaction from working in a business that he himself takes a
substantial part in managing. . . .
Thus, a shareholder in a closely held corporation often has a
significant investment interest in his job. He often invests for the
purpose of having a job, and the salary and other benefits he re
ceives are conceived to be part of the return on his investment
. . . . After discharge, the minority is relegated to the corpora
tion’s expected returns to justify the risk of its investment capital.
As discussed above, these returns are unlikely to be satisfactory
on their own.61

In the closely held setting, therefore, majority conduct that
negatively affects a shareholder’s employment or management po
sition will often impact the shareholder’s expected return. As a re
sult, the conduct can usually be viewed as harming the
shareholder’s rights, and a fiduciary duty analysis should be in
61.

Ragazzo, supra note 52, at 1109-11.
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voked.62 By citing terminations of employment and removals from
management as examples of freeze-out conduct, and by suggesting
that the shareholder-centered fiduciary duty was meant to protect
against such conduct,63 the Donahue court demonstrated that it ap
preciated these points. More importantly, courts following a Dona
hue-like approach have found breaches of fiduciary duty when the
controlling group unjustifiably terminates the employment of a mi
62. Majority conduct that negatively affects a shareholder’s employment or man
agement position will not always impact the shareholder’s expected return and, corre
spondingly, should not always be viewed as harming the shareholder’s rights. The
shareholder must establish that all of the investors mutually understood that employ
ment and/or management was a benefit granted to shareholders in the company. In the
absence of such a showing, the employment/management position should be viewed as
unconnected to the shareholder’s expected return and outside the scope of the share
holder’s protected rights. As a result, a fiduciary duty analysis should not be triggered:
A Donahue-like fiduciary duty protects shareholders and shareholder
rights. When asserting that a Donahue-like fiduciary duty has been breached,
therefore, the plaintiff minority has the burden of proving that his shareholder
rights have been harmed. When that harm is to a right or benefit that is tradi
tionally afforded to shareholders—e.g., the right to vote . . . —that burden is
easily met. So long as the plaintiff has the status of a shareholder, he is enti
tled to all of the status-based benefits that shareholders receive. The control
ling shareholder cannot interfere with those benefits without harming the
plaintiff as a shareholder and, correspondingly, implicating the duty.
When the minority asserts that he has been deprived of employment or
some other non-traditional shareholder benefit, however, his burden of prov
ing that his shareholder rights have been harmed is satisfied only by showing
that, in the corporation at issue, the benefit was part of his rights as a share
holder. In other words, the minority must demonstrate a connection between
his shareholder status and the asserted benefit (an employment position, a
management position, or any other non-traditional shareholder benefit) by es
tablishing that the shareholders mutually understood that the status and the
benefit went hand-in-hand in the company. Stated yet another way, a Dona
hue-like fiduciary duty protects non-traditional shareholder benefits only
when the minority can establish that, in his company, the benefit was reasona
bly understood by the participants to be an entitlement that a shareholder
received as a result of becoming a shareholder in the venture. By showing that
the participants viewed the benefit as a component of a shareholder’s return
on investment, the minority demonstrates that the benefit was part of his
rights as a shareholder in the particular corporation at issue. When the major
ity interferes with that benefit, therefore, the fiduciary duty provides
protection.
MOLL & RAGAZZO, supra note 5, § 7.01[D][1][a][iii], at 7-59 to 7-61 (footnotes omitted); see id. § 7.01[D][1][a][iii], at 7-63 (“Because the plaintiff was unable to establish a
connection between his shareholder status and his employment in the corporation, he
was unable to show that his termination harmed him as a shareholder. As a result, his
firing did not breach a fiduciary duty.”); see also id. § 7.01[D][1][b][ii][A] (discussing
the same issue in “reasonable expectations” terms).
63. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513, 515 (Mass. 1975).
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nority shareholder and removes him from the board of directors—
even when de facto dividends are apparently not at issue.64
It is important to underscore that acknowledging that employ
ment and management positions are often part of a shareholder’s
rights in a closely held corporation,65 and recognizing that judicial
action is needed to protect those rights even when de facto divi
dends are not involved, enacted a meaningful change in the law. As
mentioned, under traditional corporate law principles, employment
and management positions are not ordinarily viewed as part of
one’s rights as a shareholder; thus, terminations of employment and
removals from management do not generally invoke a fiduciary
duty analysis.66 The Supreme Court of Utah recently made similar
observations:
In Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy [683 A.2d 37 (Del. 1996)] . . .
the Delaware Supreme Court noted that Delaware had not
adopted Massachusetts’ approach to fiduciary duties, but instead
imposed identical duties on shareholders of closely held corpora
tions and public corporations. Additionally, the Delaware Su
preme Court distinguished between the plaintiff’s rights as a
stockholder and his contractual rights as an employee. While the
court noted [that] the Riblet plaintiff had not alleged that his ter
mination amounted to a wrongful freeze-out of his stock interest,
in subsequent cases where the plaintiff has made such allegations,
other courts following Delaware’s approach have determined
that any injury caused by a termination decision would only be
an injury to an individual’s employment interests and not to his
interests as a stockholder. At least one court has described this
approach as being more predictable because it treats all corpora
tions the same way. The Delaware approach thus stands in sharp
contrast to the fiduciary duty standard followed by the majority
of states.67
64. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64
(Mass. 1976) (no evidence that employment or management position was used as a
vehicle for distributing company profits); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 384-85,
387-88 (N.D. 1987) (same).
65. To repeat, while employment and management positions are often part of a
shareholder’s rights in a closely held corporation, they should not always be viewed in
this manner. See supra note 62.
66. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
67. McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 154-55 (Utah 2009) (citations omitted);
see also Berman v. Physical Med. Assocs., 225 F.3d 429, 433 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that
“any injury caused by the termination decision itself would be an injury to his interests
as an employee, not as a stockholder”).
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Thus, when Donahue and similar cases protect employment
and management interests as part of one’s rights as a shareholder,
the protection goes above and beyond what traditional corporate
law would provide. In this respect, the Donahue doctrine does re
sult in a significant change in the law.
B. The Dilution of Business Judgment Rule Deference
In conjunction with its efforts to protect employment and man
agement rights in the closely held corporation, Donahue and its
progeny also changed the law by limiting the impact of the business
judgment rule. Articulations of the business judgment rule vary,
but the rule generally operates to shield a manager from liability so
long as the manager’s decision was made “on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.”68 Under the rule, courts review the
substantive business decisions of those in control with considerable
deference and with a correspondingly minimal amount of scru
tiny.69 Because of this deference, it is usually difficult to challenge
internal matters—such as employment, management, or dividend
decisions—in disputes involving business organizations.
The Donahue doctrine, however, significantly curtails the ef
fects of the business judgment rule. By specifically noting that em
ployment, management, dividend, and other internal decisions can
68. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (“The business judgment rule has been well formu
lated by . . . other cases. Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good
faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach
their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all
material facts reasonably available.” (citation omitted)); Fields v. Sax, 462 N.E.2d 983,
986 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“A corporate director will not be held liable for honest errors
or mistakes of judgment as long as the decision does not involve fraud, illegality or
conflict of interest.”); id. at 989 (“Absent evidence of bad faith, fraud, illegality, or gross
overreaching, courts are not at liberty to interfere with the exercise of business judg
ment by corporate directors.”); Ironite Prods. Co. v. Samuels, 985 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1998) (“We will not interfere with the decisions of the Board of Directors
absent fraud, illegal conduct, or an irrational business judgment.”). See generally MOLL
& RAGAZZO, supra note 5, § 6.02[C][1], at 6-30 to 6-43 (discussing the business judgment rule).
69. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 93 (1991) (“Statements of the [business judgment]
rule vary; its terms are far less important than the fact that there is a specially deferen
tial approach.”); see also Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 662 (“[C]ourts fairly consistently have
been disinclined to interfere in those facets of internal corporate operations, such as the
selection and retention or dismissal of officers, directors or employees, which essentially
involve management decisions subject to the principle of majority control.”).
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be part of a majority-directed freeze-out, and by explicitly mention
ing the business judgment rule as a traditional impediment to chal
lenging such decisions,70 the Donahue court strongly suggested that
its shareholder-to-shareholder fiduciary duty framework was meant
to curb (if not displace) the traditional deference of the business
judgment rule. In fact, in the subsequent decision of Wilkes v. Spr
ingside Nursing Home, Inc., the business judgment rule did not pre
vent the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from finding a
breach of the Donahue fiduciary duty when a minority shareholder
was unjustifiably terminated from employment and removed from
the board of directors in a closely held corporation that did not pay
dividends.71
70. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14 (Mass. 1975).
71. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64. In Wilkes, the court acknowledged majority
prerogatives and altered the Donahue framework as a result:
[W]e are concerned that untempered application of the strict good faith stan
dard enunciated in Donahue to cases such as the one before us will result in
the imposition of limitations on legitimate action by the controlling group in a
close corporation which will unduly hamper its effectiveness in managing the
corporation in the best interests of all concerned. The majority, concededly,
have certain rights to what has been termed “selfish ownership” in the corpo
ration which should be balanced against the concept of their fiduciary obliga
tion to the minority.
Therefore, when minority stockholders in a close corporation bring suit
against the majority alleging a breach of the strict good faith duty owed to
them by the majority, we must carefully analyze the action taken by the con
trolling stockholders in the individual case. It must be asked whether the con
trolling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action. In
asking this question, we acknowledge the fact that the controlling group in a
close corporation must have some room to maneuver in establishing the busi
ness policy of the corporation. It must have a large measure of discretion, for
example, in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding whether to merge or
consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate officers, dismissing directors
with or without cause, and hiring and firing corporate employees.
When an asserted business purpose for their action is advanced by the
majority, however, we think it is open to minority stockholders to demonstrate
that the same legitimate objective could have been achieved through an alter
native course of action less harmful to the minority’s interest. If called on to
settle a dispute, our courts must weigh the legitimate business purpose, if any,
against the practicability of a less harmful alternative.
Id. at 663 (citations omitted). Despite this acknowledgement of majority prerogatives,
subjecting the majority’s conduct to a legitimate business purpose/less harmful alterna
tive analysis indicates that the business judgment rule has largely been displaced, as the
court is doing more than simply asking whether a decision by the controlling group can
be attributed to a rational business purpose. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (observing that decisions are protected under the business
judgment rule “if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose”). Indeed, the
Wilkes framework requires proof of a legitimate business purpose for the majority’s
conduct—not simply an attribution by the court. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
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Put differently, the Donahue court recognized, at least implic
itly, that conflicts of interest—the presence of which bar application
of the business judgment rule72—can be more subtle in the closely
held setting. As a result, the court understood that a broader view
of such conflicts was needed. For example, whereas a majority-di
rected decision to withhold dividends may affect all shares in the
same manner,73 the decision in a closely held corporation may be
motivated by an effort to coerce a minority shareholder to sell out
to the majority at an unfairly low price.74 In a publicly held corpo
ration, the denial of dividends does not have a similar coercive ef
fect, as a company’s retention of profits simply boosts the market
value of its shares—a value that an investor can capture at any time
by selling into the market.75 Actions that do not appear to provide
disproportionate benefit to the controlling group in the publicly
held setting, in other words, may very well be designed to improp-

Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 100 (2004)
(“[T]he reference to a rational business purpose requires only the possibility that the
decision was actuated by a legitimate business reason, not that directors must prove the
existence of such a reason.”). In addition, even with proof of a legitimate business
purpose, the Wilkes analysis still finds liability if there are alternatives that are less
harmful to the minority. Thus, the Donahue/Wilkes framework is quite different from a
classic business judgment rule approach, as the framework calls for close scrutiny of the
majority’s decisions. See Terry A. O’Neill, Self-Interest and Concern for Others in the
Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation
in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646, 692 (1992) (“The burden-shifting
scheme devised in Wilkes effectively deprives majority shareholders of the protection of
the business judgment rule by requiring close judicial scrutiny of the majority’s action
whenever the minority is harmed.”).
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Dividend Policy in the Close
Corporation, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841, 858-59 & n.64 (2003) (discussing the divi
dend “irrelevance proposition” and noting that “[i]f a dividend of one dollar per share
is paid, a . . . shareholder is enriched by one dollar per share,” while “[i]f that same
amount is instead retained in the company, the company’s value increases by one dollar
per share and, correspondingly, the value of the . . . stock increases by one dollar per
share”).
74. See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (“Majority ‘freeze-out’ schemes which
withhold dividends are designed to compel the minority to relinquish stock at inade
quate prices.”); see also Litle v. Waters, Civ. A. No. 12155, 1992 WL 25758, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 11, 1992) (describing the plaintiff’s allegation “that the company was rich with
cash and that the only reason that the company did not make dividends was to aid [the
majority] to buy [the minority] out for less than fair value”); Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664
(“[W]e may infer that a design to pressure Wilkes into selling his shares to the corpora
tion at a price below their value well may have been at the heart of the majority’s
plan.”).
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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erly favor the controlling group in the closely held setting.76 By
suggesting that internal management decisions should be subject to
real scrutiny, the Donahue court showed an appreciation of this
point and signaled that traditional business judgment rule deference
was less appropriate in the closely held setting.77 In the years fol
lowing Donahue, several courts have acknowledged even more ex
plicitly that majority shareholder decisions in closely held
corporations call for more judicial scrutiny than conventional busi
ness judgment rule deference.78
76. Cf. Georgeson v. DuPage Surgical Consultants, Ltd., No. 05 CV 1653, 2007
WL 914219, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2007) (rejecting the defendants’ argument that,
“as a matter of law, their conduct was not oppressive because it was protected by the
business judgment rule” because “the presumption that normally shields defendants for
their business decisions does not apply if the plaintiff presents evidence of fraud, bad
faith, or self-dealing,” and observing that the evidence, “if true, would establish that the
defendants acted in their own self-interest when they refused to compensate [the minor
ity shareholder] for his shares and denied him the other compensation to which he
contends he is entitled”).
77. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512-16. In addition, because the managerial con
straints provided by a market are absent in a closely held corporation, the judicial def
erence embodied in the business judgment rule makes even less sense:
Market restraints are most visible and workable in the case of publicly held
corporations. If management is inefficient, indulges its own preferences, or
otherwise acts contrary to shareholder interests, dissatisfied shareholders will
sell their shares and move to more attractive investment opportunities. As
more shareholders express their dissatisfaction by selling, the market price of
the company’s shares will decline to the point where existing management is
exposed to the risk of being displaced through a corporate takeover. . . . The
mere threat of displacement, whether or not realized, is a powerful incentive
for managers of publicly held corporations to promote their shareholders’ in
terests so as to keep the price of the company’s shares as high and their own
positions as secure as possible.
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 12, at 39-40; see, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling
Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1262 n.18 (Conn. 1994) (“The market for corporate control serves
to constrain managers’ conduct that does not maximize shareholder wealth. It there
fore serves to align the interests of managers more closely with the interests of share
holders in publicly traded corporations. The market for corporate control does not
affect, however, the incentives of managers of closely held corporations.”).
78. See, e.g., Smith v. Atl. Props., Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801, 804 (Mass. App. Ct.
1981) (stating, in a closely held corporation dispute, that “[t]he judgment . . . necessarily
disregards the general judicial reluctance to interfere with a corporation’s dividend pol
icy ordinarily based upon the business judgment of its directors”); Fox v. 7L Bar Ranch
Co., 645 P.2d 929, 935 (Mont. 1982) (“When it is also considered that in close corpora
tions dividend withholding may be used by controlling shareholders to force out minor
ity shareholders, the traditional judicial restraint in interfering with corporate dividend
policy cannot be justified.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grato v. Grato, 639
A.2d 390, 396 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“[J]udicial consideration of a claim of
majority oppression or freeze-out in a closely held corporation is guided by considera
tions broader than those espoused in defendants’ version of the ‘business judgment
rule.’”); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
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CONCLUSION
Donahue had (and continues to have) a significant impact on
the law of fiduciary duty in closely held corporations. Unquestiona
bly, Donahue’s legacy stems primarily from its recognition of the
peculiar vulnerability of minority shareholders in closely held cor
porations. This Article has argued, however, that Donahue did
more than merely recognize a problem—Donahue changed the law,
although the changes that it has been credited with are overstated
in some respects and understated in others. While debate over the
impact of Donahue will undoubtedly continue, it is beyond debate
that Donahue helped to spark an evolution in the law of fiduciary
duty in closely held corporations—an evolution that has improved
the rights of minority shareholders in Massachusetts and beyond.

Div. 1979) (“[T]he statutory language embodies a legislative determination that freezeout maneuvers in close corporations constitute an abuse of corporate power. Tradi
tional principles of corporate law, such as the business judgment rule, have failed to
curb this abuse. Consequently, actions of close corporations that conform with these
principles cannot be immune from scrutiny.”); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 11, at 293 (“It makes sense, therefore, to have greater judicial review of terminations of managerial (or investing) employees in closely held corporations than would be
consistent with the business judgment rule. The same approach could be used with
salary, dividend, and employment decisions in closely held corporations where the risks
of conflicts of interest are greater.”).
When courts suggest that a rejection of business judgment rule deference is war
ranted, they are presumably contemplating majority decisions that impact the rights of
individual shareholders. For more general decisions, such as the choice of one business
opportunity over another, courts should typically defer to the majority’s prerogatives.
Cf. James D. Cox, Equal Treatment for Shareholders: An Essay, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
615, 631 (1997) (“Though great flexibility should be accorded managers on matters re
lated to the conduct of the corporation’s business, this is not necessarily the case regard
ing decisions that impact the relative rights of owners’ interests in the firm. The former
is more clearly the type of business activity which is best lodged with the firm’s manag
ers; the latter is not.” (footnote omitted)).
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